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questions. (See e.g. id., transcript at 2-3 (trading off after Tiedemann maintained he did 
not want to talk)). They used tactics to take advantage of Tiedemann's condition and to 
get him talking for a confession. 
Within months after the interrogation, Tiedemann was declared by experts and the 
trial court to be incompetent. (See R. 532, 534 (his "comprehension for complex 
questions or directions was impaired"; lf[h]e demonstrate[d] significant impairment in 
judgment, attention and concentration, and a mild deficit of immediate memory")). Also, 
his Toluene addiction resulted in "repetitive episodes of acute delirium." (R. 534). 
Tiedemann was committed to the state hospital, where he was treated for ten years. 
Experts opined in early 1992 that, given the nature of the long-term brain damage, he 
may not be rehabilitative. (See R. 536-37, 545). 
Notwithstanding those facts, the state disputes that Tiedemann was mentally 
impaired at the time of the interrogation. (See Brief of Appellee, at 17-18, 27-28). It 
disputes that he was unable to voluntarily waive his rights. The state claims the interroga-
tion itself is evidence of competence and voluntariness because Tiedemann was alert and 
provided responses to complex questions. (See id.) Also, the state claims officers had no 
time to employ coercive tactics because Tiedemann confessed to the shootings minutes 
into the interview, and it suggests that officers did not know of Tiedemann's impaired 
mental condition when they requested a waiver from him. (See id. at 22-23, 27-28). 
Tiedemann replies to those assertions as follows: while Tiedemann appeared to 
answer complex questions, his answers were irrational. (See R. 638:10 (the prosecutor 
described his answers as "weird and definitely not a normal statement"; and acknow-
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ledged the "strange behavior of the defendant in the interview"); 611, transcript at 2 
(Tiedemann stated his address as 1308 Hummingbird), and R. 1-5 (record reflected it as 
3874 Hummingbird); R. 611, transcript at 7 (Tiedemann identified his Utah license plate 
as 5. . . 2221CN); R. 611, transcript at 9, 33 (Tiedemann stated Suzie lived at 1446 West 
400 North, Apt. C; then "seven, seven fifteen, fourth north and 740 East," Apt. C)). 
His answers were confused. He did not know what day it was (R. 611, transcript 
at 4), or the day of the week. (Id.) When officers asked where Tiedemann kept the guns, 
he stated in his hands. (Id at 6). When they asked how long he had been with Suzie, he 
answered, "Thousands of years." (Id. at 7). When they asked whether she worked, he said 
she was a prostitute, who shoots heroin and "[t]hat's why she has to stupid work." (Id.) 
When officers asked when Tiedemann moved to West Valley, he answered, "in May of 
1989 or 1990 or 1991 or whatever." (IcL at 9). When officers asked what he thought 
about before the shootings, he stated, "I don't know what. I love everyone." (Id. at 13). 
While the state claims Tiedemann did not disclose mental problems or impair-
ments before "page nine of the transcript," and "[njothing before that would have alerted 
the officers" to his deficiencies (Brief of Appellee at 28), the record reflects otherwise. 
After the officers initially gave Miranda warnings, Tiedemann disclosed he was 
intoxicated, he had used Toluene long-term, and he was incapable of answering 
questions. (R. 611, video at 1:58 to 2:01). Officers did not ask follow-up questions, but 
instead left the room for 12 minutes. When they returned, they again administered 
Miranda warnings as though that would cure Tiedemann's disclosures and deficiencies. 
They then asked if Tiedemann were intoxicated, and they moved immediately on to 
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questions concerning the shootings. (R. 611, video at 2:13 & transcript at 1-2). 
Thus, the officers were advised of Tiedemann's condition and that he was 
incapable of answering questions before "page nine of the transcript" (quoting Brief of 
Appellee at 28), and before the confessions. Notably, both in the early stages of the 
interview and at page nine, the disclosures did not deter the officers. They proceeded 
with questions for the confessions. (See R. 611, video and transcript at 9-35). 
Since the officers were alerted at the outset that Tiedemann was intoxicated and 
incapable of answering questions, they cannot take refuge in their decision to disregard 
his disclosures until after they obtained confessions. Indeed, under the law, where 
Tiedemann's initial and early responses suggest he could not answer questions (R. 611, 
video at 1:58 to 2:01), officers were obligated to resolve that issue. See Leyva, 951 P.2d 
at 743 (stating officer must clarify an ambiguous statement relating to suspect's ability to 
understand and waive Miranda rights if the statement is made in a pre-waiver scenario). 
Instead, they proceeded with a second set of Miranda warnings. (R. 611, transcript at 1). 
Finally, while the state acknowledges that intoxication is a factor supporting 
involuntariness (Brief of Appellee at 29-30), it discounts it in this case on the grounds 
that intoxication is not enough. (Id.) Yet, Tiedemann has not asked this Court to find the 
confessions involuntary due only to intoxication. (See Brief of Appellant, Point I.B.(l)). 
Tiedemann's intoxication, long-term substance abuse, incompetence, and inability to 
understand questions, were relevant considerations. (Id.) 
For reasons set forth here and in the Brief of Appellant, Tiedemann respectfully 
requests that this Court find the interrogation to be unconstitutional where officers 
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disregcr ; '" ' relevant ^-^kers, impairments and deficiencies to pursue Miranda waivers 
and the confessions. The confessions should be suppressed. 
B TIEDEMANN'S STATEMENT, "I DON'T WANT TO TALK ABOUT IT," 
WAS AN UNEQUIVOCAL INVOCATION OF HIS RIGHTS. OFFICERS 
WERE REQUIRED TO STOP QUESTIONING. 
If a suspect originally waives his Miranda rights, he ina\ \m o le (hose rights later 
during questioning "in any manner, at any time." Miranda. * > > ^ ! • ,,:or 
invocation nmsl be imimihij.'iious. Sec Davis v. I I.S., 512 U.S. 452, 459 ( 1 W 4 J . On^c 
the invocation occurs, officers must stop asking questions. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 
U S 96, 104 (1975); Miranda, > - • . . 4 . , .. ; ontinued questioning K.- : . ; . . . 
!^ "- 'I " :* : • » : ' ' ' • • :.••-.. * ••• " •• ebiic or otherwise." 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. Also, any responses obtained by officers due to such con-
tinued questioning "may not he used to cast w. -u.,- - • i delendam ,% ,.w na,> subsequently 
ii lvoked 1 lis Miranda nOii - rj.ee SniiUi v. lllinoi ^ • l r" • : 984). 
As stated in the opening brief, the Court in Mosley, confirmed that Miranda gives 
a suspect the right to control the topics discussed, and the riglit to determine whether the 
interview w ill proem I .il .ill (Sec Unci' iif Appellant ;it ,\X ",>); Moslcy. -1 1 ] -• '•-•3-
04. "Through the exercise of his option to terminate questioning, [a suspect] can control 
the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the 
interrogation." Mosley, 423 U.S. i it 103 04. 
: L
 defendant in Mosley initially waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk to 
officers about a series of robberies. Id. at 97. He invoked his right tc> not talk when he 
said "he did not want to answer any questions about the robberies." Id. Officers were 
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allowed to proceed with interrogation later, only after sufficient attenuation. See id. at 
104-05 (ruling that subsequent questioning was permissible after two hours, where 
defendant was questioned by a different officer, at a different location, about an unrelated 
crime, and defendant was given full Miranda warnings before second interrogation). 
As set forth in the opening brief, shortly into the police interrogation, Tiedemann 
invoked the right to remain silent. (Brief of Appellant, Point LB.(2); R. 611, video & 
transcript at 2). When officers asked him about the shootings in West Valley and what 
happened to Suzie, Tiedemann stated, "I don't want to talk about it." (Id.) Officers then 
confirmed, "You don't want to talk about it?" Tiedemann stated unequivocally, "No." As 
they continued to press, Tiedemann was silent. (Id., video at 2:15 to 2:17). He ultimately 
gave in only after it was clear that the officers would not stop the interrogation. 
The record supports that Tiedemann invoked the right to remain silent. Officers 
were required to honor that request. Instead they continued to press him. That was 
unlawful. See Smith, 469 U.S. at 99-100; (Brief of Appellant, Point LB.(2)). 
The state disagrees. It seems to argue that when Tiedemann stated, "I don't want 
to talk about it," he did not mean what he said, and officers were free to interpret the 
statement to suggest that Tiedemann had an "emotional aversion" to answering questions. 
(Quoting Brief of Appellee at 35). 
The state's argument is irrelevant for factual and legal reasons. With respect to the 
facts, the trial court did not find that Tiedemann had an emotional aversion to answering 
questions. (See R. 586, 590). In addition, the prosecutor, who investigated the facts for 
the suppression hearing, chose not to put officers on the stand to testify to such an 
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inteipretation for a reason. See Utah R. Prof. Cond. 3.8, Comment (2006) ("A prosecutor 
has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simp!) {La of an ud\ ocaie '). 
whether a suspect has invoked his rights during an interrogation is an objective one. 
Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59 (to avoid "difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to 
officers," tl le qi lestion of1 vhetl ler a si ispect has invoked 1 lis rights d/t iring intei rogation is 
objective). A statement either is an assertion of rights or it is not. See id. 
Also, "a suspect need not 'speak with the discrimination of an Oxford doi i "' 
Davis, 512 \ J.S at 4-59 (cite oi i litted) I le need oi lly ai tiei llate his desire so tl lat a i eason-
able officer would understand it to be a request for a lawyer or a statement that defendant 
does not wish to answer questions. See id. Once a suspect makes his request during the 
intc:rogah '• .. ' ! • ->n"--'-f i: i i^ c a-aiir. ; r =. - : '••.i---. • N>* 
the request may have been made out of fear, intimidation, or pain. 
In this case, where Tiedemann stated he did not want to talk about the shootings, 
his request was clear, Midi i-»all llml \\ .is n/quiivd A , \\\w niliin'hl;itn>ii ui i.'iin»tinii;il 
aversion that may have been associated with the request need not concern the officers. 
They were required to stop questioning. 
Next, the state claims that nffirns ""expressly icadvised |dd'cndant| thai he did im| 
have to answer any questions and that he could stop the interview at any time." (Brief of 
Appellee at 36-37), By that, the state seems to suggest that officers attempted to follow 
Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-06, before continuing with tlle interrogation. 
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Yet, according to the record, after Tiedemann invoked his righl to not talk to 
officers, they advised him, "we're not going to force you [to] talk about anything. We're 
asking you questions. As Detective Edwards stated, you can answer this question [J, not 
answer that question, answer this question, not answer that question. You don't have to 
answer any of our questions at all. You can stop at anytime." (R. 611, transcript at 3 
(emphasis added)). By that statement, officers communicated they would continue to ask 
questions no matter what. (Id.) That was inappropriate. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (if 
a suspect invokes his rights during questioning, officers must stop). Officers cannot 
continue to ask questions in the hope of creating an ambiguity or confusion in the 
situation. See id.; see also e.g. Smith, 469 U.S. at 98-99 (recognizing that to use 
continued questioning to cast doubt is "intolerable"). 
To the extent the officers intended to communicate that if Tiedemann did not want 
to answer questions, they would stop asking, their actions did not comport with that 
message. Tiedemann advised officers that he did not want to talk about the shootings. 
They asked him repeatedly "what" he did not want to talk about and "why." (R. 611, 
transcript at 2-3). Tiedemann was silent. (Id., video at 2:15 to 2:17). By failing to honor 
Tiedemann's request to not talk about the shootings, the officers sent the message that 
they would ask questions whether Tiedemann wanted to answer or not. That is unlawful. 
The state has cited to U.S. v. May, 52 F.3d 885, 890 (10th Cir. 1995), in support of 
its claim that officers gave Tiedemann proper advice when they told him they would keep 
questioning and he could answer or not. (See Brief of Appellee at 24 n.10). That case is 
inapplicable. There, defendants May and Lisa Tarasiuk were charged with crimes relating 
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to the distribution of cocaine and a "reverse sting" operation on October 29, 1991. After 
May's arrest, officers questioned him. He made contradictory statements to them. May, 
52F.3dat886. At trial, May admitted that he had been involved previously in cocaine 
transactions, but had withdrawn from all participation prior to the October 29 event, and 
then he participated only because he believed Tarasiuk's life was in danger. Id at 887. 
During closing argument, the prosecutor took May to task for not disclosing his 
withdrawal theory until after he had obtained a lawyer for trial. Id. at 887. May was 
convicted. On appeal, he claimed the prosecutor's statements "were an impermissible 
reference" to post-arrest silence under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). May, 52 F.3d 
at 889. Doyle supports that when a defendant invokes the right to remain silent, the 
government may not use that silence for purposes of impeachment when the defendant 
later takes the witness stand and presents a defense. See id. at 889 (citing Doyle). 
The court in May considered Doyle to be inapplicable. IdL at 889-90. May never 
invoked his right to remain silent. He "simply chose to tell various versions of his 'story' 
when speaking to the authorities." Id. at 889. Also, the prosecutor's comments in 
closing focused on May's "prior inconsistent stories." IdL at 890. That was permissible. 
Significantly, the Doyle doctrine is not at issue in Tiedemann's case. Likewise, the 
court in May did not examine the effect on a suspect when an officer disregards a 
defendant's request to not talk about matters. See May, 52F .3da t890 . 
In this case, where Tiedemann invoked the right to remain silent, the officers' 
advice to him—that they would ask questions and Tiedemann could answer some and not 
others—was not enough. Officers were required to honor Tiedemann's request and stop 
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questioning. Any further questioning would have to be sufficiently attenuated from the 
initial interrogation to be valid. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-06; State v. Peirce. 364 
N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 1985) (allowing admission of statement made more than 2 hours 
after defendant invoked the right to remain silent, where statement was taken at different 
location, by different officers, after fresh warnings); State v. Okegbenro. 409 N.W.2d 1, 3 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
Finally, the state cites to Owen v. State, 862 So.2d 687 (Fla. 2003), to suggest that 
the statements, T d rather not talk about it," and "I don't want to talk about it," are 
equivocal and do not require officers to stop questioning. (See Brief of Appellee at 37). 
Owen is not controlling here. To explain, in that case, the defendant first appealed his 
death conviction in 1990. See Owen v. State, 560 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1990). He argued that 
officers violated his Miranda rights when they continued questioning after he said, "I'd 
rather not talk about it," and "I don't want to talk about it." Id at 210-11. 
Under Florida law at the time, if a suspect made an equivocal assertion, officers 
were required to stop substantive questioning. Id, at 211. Thus, for the analysis in 1990, 
the court was not required to ascertain whether the statement was ^equivocal. The court 
ruled that the defendant's assertions were "at the least" "an equivocal invocation of the 
Miranda right" and officers were required to stop substantive questioning. Id. 
After the 1990 decision in Owen, three things happened. First, the Florida court 
"in numerous other opinions" made reference to the responses in Owen as an example of 
equivocal utterances. Owen, 862 So.2d at 697. Second, the U. S. Supreme Court issued 
Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452 (1994), stating that when a suspect, who has made a knowing 
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and voluntary waiver of his or her Miranda rights, thereafter makes an "ambiguous or 
equivocal" reference to counsel, officers are not required to stop questioning. Id. at 459. 
They are required to stop the interrogation only when the request is unambiguous. Sjee 
id. Third, Owen's case returned to the Florida court in 2003 on the Miranda issue after 
retrial. Owen, 862 So.2d at 690. Since the court had previously characterized Owen's 
responses as an example of equivocal utterances, it affirmed the characterization without 
analysis. Id. at 697. The state has cited to that case in its brief here. (Brief of Appellee 
at 37). Yet, Owen does not govern this case. This Court may engage in a proper analysis. 
Here, when officers provided the Miranda warnings and asked if Tiedemann 
wished to speak to them, Tiedemann answered, "Ya." (R. 611, transcript at 1). There-
after, as the officers began to ask questions about the "murders" at Hummingbird Drive 
and Suzie, Tiedemann responded that he did not want to talk about it. (R. 611, transcript 
at 2). Officers confirmed: "You don't want to talk about it?" Tiedemann answered, "No." 
(Id.) As officers continued to press Tiedemann, he was silent. (R. 611, transcript at 2-3 
& video at 2:15 to 2:17). He gave in only after it was clear they would not stop. (See id.) 
Tiedemann's statement, "I don't want to talk about it," and his silence thereafter 
constituted an unequivocal, unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent. 
In McGraw v. Holland, 257 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2001), defendant Tina McGraw 
signed a form waiving her Miranda rights and was interviewed by police about a gang 
rape. Id. at 514-15. During questioning, she stated, "I don't want to talk about it. I don't 
want to remember it." Id at 515. As the interrogation continued, she repeated the 
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statement. "Refusing to take no for an answer, the detective kept urging full disclosure." 
Id. at 515. "Succumbing at last," McGraw provided a detailed confession. Id. at 516. 
She was convicted, and thereafter appealed to the state court. The court affirmed. Id. 
When she filed for relief in federal court, the trial court dismissed the case. Id. 
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reinstated it. The 
appellate court ruled that McGraw's statement, "I don't want to talk about it," was an 
unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent. See id. at 517. 
The Miranda Court made it crystal clear that giving the prescribed warnings 
before the commencement of questioning does not preclude invocation of the right 
to silence during questioning: "Once warnings have been given, the subsequent 
procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to 
or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must 
cease." [Miranda, 384 U.S.] at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis supplied). 
As the Supreme Court subsequently explained in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 
96, 103, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), "[a] reasonable and faithful 
interpretation of the Miranda opinion must rest on the intention of the Court in 
that case to adopt 'fully effective means ... to notify the person of his right to 
silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored....1" 
[Id. (q]uoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602.) (Emphasis supplied.) 
Id at 517-18. The court also cited to Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, and stated: 
As far as we can see, however, there was nothing ambiguous about Tina's repeated 
insistence she did not want to talk about the rape. When Tina kept saying, without 
qualification, that she just did not want to talk about the subject - making these 
declarations after she had been formally advised of her right of silence - it would 
simply not be reasonable to take her words at less than face value. And if her 
reason for not wanting to talk about the rape was a fear that she would be shot and 
killed [in retaliation] if she did, the existence of such a fear would not make it any 
less clear that she meant what she was saying. If anything, it would make it even 
more clear that she really did not want to talk about the rape. We are aware of no 
support, either in logic or in law, for the proposition that an otherwise 
unambiguous expression of a desire to remain silent can somehow become 
ambiguous if prompted by a fear of retaliation. 
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McGraw, 257 F.3d at 519. 
It is true that Tina did not say to the detective, in so many words, "I want to 
exercise my option to terminate this interview altogether if I will otherwise have to 
talk about the rape." But the Supreme Court has long held that "no ritualistic 
formula or talismanic phrase is essential in order to invoke the privilege against 
self-incrimination." See Emspakv. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194, 75 S.Ct. 687, 
99 L.Ed. 997 (1955). Any reasonable police officer, knowing that exercise of the 
right to silence must be "scrupulously honored," would have understood that when 
Tina repeatedly said she did not want to talk about the rape, she should not have 
been told that she had to talk about it. For the state trial court to hold otherwise, 
we believe, was objectively unreasonable. 
McGraw, 257 F.3d at 518; see also State v. Day, 619 N.W.2d 745, 749-750 (Minn. 2000) 
(the statement, "I don't want to tell you guys anything to say about me in court" was an 
unequivocal invocation); State v. Bishop, 621 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (state-
ment "I don't want to talk about it" "made clear that defendant wanted to remain silent"). 
In this case, Tiedemann unambiguously invoked the right to remain silent when he 
stated, "I don't want to talk about it." (R. 611, transcript at 2). The trial court's ruling on 
the matter should be reversed and the confessions should be suppressed. 
POINT II. TIEDEMANNS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED 
BY THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE. 
A. THE COURT MAY DECIDE THE FEDERAL DUE PROCESS ISSUE ON 
THE BRIEFS. 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that before a defendant in a criminal 
case maybe entitled to relief under a federal due process analysis when the government 
destroys potentially useful evidence, the defendant must show that the government agents 
acted in bad faith. Arizona v. Youngblood. 488 U.S. 51. 58 (1988). If bad faith is 
established, the criminal charges must be dismissed. 
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In this case, police collected physical evidence at 3874 Hummingbird Street on 
November 2, 1991, after fatal shootings there. (R. 389; see also R. 477-78, 601). In 
1992, Tiedemann was declared incompetent by the trial judge and experts, and the state 
dismissed the charges. (R. 389; see also R. 477-78; 601). Thereafter, in response to 
inquiries by Tiedemann, prosecutors represented they would not pursue charges against 
him. (R. 389-90, 478). From 1993 to 1994, government agents destroyed the physical 
evidence relating to the shootings. (R. 390; see also R. 477-78, 601). 
Given the government's representations and the circumstances, Tiedemann never 
had the opportunity to examine the evidence. State agents likewise did not analyze it. 
In 2002, the state filed homicide charges against Tiedemann. (R. 1-5). 
Tiedemann maintains on appeal that state agents destroyed the physical evidence 
in bad faith. The destmction was willful and deliberate and with the intent that the state 
would not pursue charges against him. (See Brief of Appellant, Point II. A.) 
The state disputes TiedemaniVs bad-faith argument on appeal. It claims, first, that 
Tiedemann did not preserve his argument for review. (See Brief of Appellee at 42-43). 
That is incorrect. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must make an objection. The 
objection must be timely and it must give the trial court notice of the error and an 
opportunity to correct it if the court deems it necessary. In State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
10 P.3d 346, this Court stated that preservation serves two important policies. 
First, "in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." Second, a 
defendant should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy 
of "enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, 
... claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." 
16 
Id at ^11 (cites omitted). The first policy of preservation is satisfied in Tiedemann's case 
with respect to destruction of the evidence and the federal analysis. (See R. 388-404). 
Specifically, Tiedemann cited to the federal due process analysis for destruction of 
evidence under Youngblood. (R. 391). He demonstrated that evidence here fell into the 
category of "potentially exculpatory," and that courts have failed to define bad faith for 
purposes of the Youngblood analysis (R. 391-92; see also Brief of Appellant at 39-42). 
Tiedemann maintained that bad faith could be established here, due to the amount of 
evidence destroyed, the seriousness of the charges, and the type of physical evidence 
where it may have raised doubts about the state's theories concerning who fired the shots, 
whether Southerland was sexually assaulted, and other relevant facts. (Brief of Appellant 
at 39-41; R. 390-94, 401 (arguing that the state "was fully aware of the value of this 
evidence" and the state "willfully destroyed]" it) (emphasis added); R. 638:24 (stating the 
officers "knew exactly what they were doing and they knew the potential of this evidence 
and that it could be potentially very, very bad for them"). 
The argument below comported with the preservation rules. It directed the "atten-
tion of the court to the claimed errors" so that it "might have an opportunity to correct 
them." Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(cites omitted). 
With regard to the second policy consideration under Hoi gate, 2000 UT 74, \\1, 
Tiedemann did not forego an objection to the due process argument for any reason. He 
specifically requested that the trial court dismiss the charges under a federal due process 
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analysis. (R. 390-94, 401). The trial court refused to do so. (R. 601-03). The issue was 
preserved. This Court may address the matter on the merits. 
Next, the state suggests that secondary evidence remaining in this case is 
comparable in nature to the physical evidence and sufficient for Tiedemann in defending 
against the first degree felony charges at issue. (Brief of Appellee at 41). In support of 
that claim the state has cited to the prosecutor's "Third Supplemental Response to 
Request for Discovery" filed in the trial court. (See id. (citing R. 60-61)). 
The discovery response lists interview tapes and transcripts, photos, autopsy 
reports, police reports, evaluations relating to Tiedemann, and criminal histories. (R. 60-
61). The secondary evidence is not a comparable substitute to the physical evidence, 
which included personal items belonging either to the shooting victims or Tiedemann; 
two handguns; audio tapes; drugs, substances, and paraphernalia; blood, hair and saliva 
samples and specimens; fingerprints; bedding; clothing; bullets; fragments; and gunshot 
residue samples. (See Brief of Appellant, Addendum E); see also Hammond v. State, 569 
A.2d 81, 89-90 (Del. 1989) (recognizing that without access to physical evidence, the 
secondary evidence had little probative value to the defendant or his expert). As stated in 
the opening brief, physical evidence had the potential of calling into question the state's 
conclusions or theories. (Brief of Appellant at 40-42). 
Finally, the state criticizes Tiedemann for arguing that the evidence was only 
potentially useful, where it had the potential to disprove Southerland's claims of how 
events transpired, to impeach her credibility, and to cause jurors to doubt her ability to 
perceive events on the night of the shooting. (See Brief of Appellee at 40-41). 
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According to the state, the argument is speculative. (Id.) 
The state's criticism is unjustified. The bad-faith test in Youngblood concerns 
destroyed evidence of which no more can be said other than that it was potentially useful. 
See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. Where the evidence was potentially useful, Tiedemann 
has made the required showing. The state destroyed the evidence in bad faith. This 
Court may decide the issue on established law and the briefs. 
B. TIEDEMANN PRESENTED A PROPER STATE ANALYSIS. THIS COURT 
MAY DECIDE THE ISSUE ON THE MERITS. 
Tiedemann has urged this Court to reject the Youngblood approach in cases where 
the government has destroyed potentially useful evidence, and to adopt instead a separate 
analysis under the Utah Constitution, art. I, § 7, that balances several factors for a proper 
remedy. (See Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point II.B.) 
As stated in the opening Brief of Appellant, this Court historically and repeatedly 
has recognized that article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution fully protects the citizens 
of this state against government action. M[T]he mandate of the due process clause of 
article I, section 7 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah Constitution is comprehensive 
in its application to all activities of state government." Foote v. Ut. Bd. of Pardons, 808 
P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added); see also State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 
1272 (Utah 1988) (relying on art. I, § 7 to strike sentencing provisions); State v. HowelK 
707 P.2d 115,118 (Utah 1985) (relying on art. I, § 7 in sentencing); State v. Brickey, 714 
P.2d 644, 646-47 (Utah 1986) (relying on art. I, § 7 in preliminary hearings); Labrum v. 
Ut. Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 908 n.5, 909 (Utah 1993) (agreeing that "due process is 
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flexible and calls for the procedural protections that the given situation demands"; and 
relying on art. I, § 7 in parole hearings); State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 
1991) (concluding that in criminal cases, the standard for admissibility of eyewitness 
identification under art. I, § 7 diverges from the federal standard); Christiansen v. Harris, 
163 P.2d 314, 315, 317 (Utah 1945) (citing to Utah's due process provision). 
Also, if a defendant makes a claim that his state due process rights were violated, 
M[i]t is the province of the judiciary to assure that a claim of the denial of due process by 
an arm of government be heard and, if justified, that it be vindicated." Foote, 808 P.2d at 
735; see dso State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) (this Court will not 
engage in a state constitutional analysis unless an argument for a different analysis under 
the state provision is briefed), vacated on other grounds, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 
(10th Cir. 1991); Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 930 (Utah 1993) 
(stating a federal analysis "does not control our analysis under the Utah Constitution"). 
Tiedemann has presented textual support for his argument under article I, § 7. 
(See Brief of Appellant at 42-45 (relying on decisions from this Court concerning state 
due process in criminal proceedings; and citing to State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1304-
07 (Utah 1986) (referring to the Utah constitutional provision and considering several 
matters to determine if defendant's due process rights were violated by the destruction of 
evidence)). And he has cited to other jurisdictions that have adopted a separate balancing 
approach under a state constitutional analysis when the government destroys potentially 
useful evidence. (See Brief of Appellant at 47-49 (citing Thome v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 
774 P.2d 1326, 1331 (Alaska 1989); State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 593 (Conn. 1995); 
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Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 83-85 (Del. 1989); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 582 
N.E.2d 496, 497 (Mass. 1991); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 916-17 (Tenn. 1999); 
State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (Vt. 1994); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504, 
511, 512 (W. Va. 1995))); see also Gurlev v. State, 639 So.2d 557, 564 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1993) (recognizing use of a three-part balancing test under Alabama law when the 
government loses or destroys evidence); State v. Schmid, 487 N.W.2d 539, 541-42 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Burcbu 669 N.Y.S.2d 299, 300 (2d Dep't 1998), appeal 
denied, 683 N.E.2d 1056 (N.Y. 1997) (ruling that the destruction of 911 tape in the 
normal course prejudiced defendant where identification was an issue). 
Tiedemann also presented policy arguments in favor of the separate analysis, 
where due process is not concerned just with bad faith actions; it is concerned with fun-
damental fairness. (Brief of Appellant at 44 (citing State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ^ 15, 34 
P.3d 767 (fundamental fairness is the touchstone of due process)). A function of 
fundamental fairness is to preserve the "integrity of the process itself." Labrum, 870 P.2d 
at 909. Also, where state agents are in possession of the information relevant to 
destruction of the evidence, the state should bear the burden of proof. (Brief of Appellant 
at 44-45). The burden should be on the party in control of the evidence and with access 
to the information. 
In this case, the state opposes the separate state constitutional analysis, claiming 
that Youngblood is fair. (Brief of Appellee at 46-48). It maintains that when the state 
fails to produce material exculpatory evidence, the defendant is prejudiced by definition 
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and entitled to a new trial. (Id. at 46). However, where evidence was destroyed before 
testing, it is "neither plainly exculpatory nor inculpatory" (id. at 47 (citing State v. 
Youngblood, 844 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Ariz. 1993)); thus, there is no showing of prejudice 
and in that instance, defendant must show bad faith. (State's Brief of Appellee at 47). If 
defendant is able to make the requisite showing, he is entitled to dismissal of the charges 
due to the unavailability of the evidence. The state maintains this is fair because 
government agents have demonstrated "bad faith in handling critical evidence." (Id.) 
Yet, if evidence is untested and therefore only potentially useful, its "critical" 
nature has not been ascertained. Indeed, the uncertain nature of the evidence makes it 
nearly impossible to show the bad faith of the officers. See Thome, 774 P.2d at 1331 n.9 
(stating Youngblood could have the effect "of encouraging the destruction of evidence to 
the extent that evidence destroyed becomes merely 'potentially useful' since its contents 
would be unprovable"). "Short of an admission by the police, it is unlikely that a 
defendant would ever be able to make the necessary showing to establish the required 
elements for proving bad faith." Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1992); 
Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 916 (stating that bad faith is extremely difficult to prove). 
Also, where Youngblood is such an impossible standard, it has no deterrent effect. 
There are no incentives for police to adopt operating procedures to ensure that evidence is 
properly collected and preserved. The standard does little to discourage the loss of 
evidence. 
Courts have considered the Youngblood requirement of bad faith to be an all-or-
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nothing litmus test that does not find a due process violation even when serious questions 
exist concerning the fundamental fairness of the trial. It "permits no consideration of the 
materiality of the missing evidence, or its effect on the defendant's case. [The] analysis 
substantially increases the defendant's burden, while reducing the prosecution's burden at 
the expense of the defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial." Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 
916-17. 
The court must either find bad faith and dismiss the charges, despite facts which 
support only a finding of gross negligence, or find no bad faith and deny the 
defendant the benefit of a favorable inference, despite the loss of material 
evidence due to the State's negligence. In such a situation the court is left with an 
all or nothing proposition leading to two equally unsatisfactory results. 
Lolly, 611 A.2d at 960; see also Delisle, 648 A.2d at 643 (stating Youngblood is too 
broad because it allows for sanctions even where a defendant has not been prejudiced; 
and it is too narrow because it limits a due process violation to cases where bad faith is 
shown, even though the loss of evidence may critically prejudice the defendant). 
If the central objective of due process is to protect the defendant's right to a funda-
mentally fair trial, a trial court should consider and balance several factors for a proper 
remedy, including the degree of negligence involved in destroying the evidence, the 
significance of the destroyed evidence in light of the secondary evidence (i.e. reports) 
that remains available, the sufficiency of the remaining evidence, and the prejudice to the 
defendant. See Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 916-17; Hammond, 569 A.2d at 86; (Brief of 
Appellant, Point II.B.) If after considering these factors, the court finds that fundamental 
fairness requires a remedy, it may fashion one that is appropriate: the court may prohibit 
any reference to facts surrounding the destroyed evidence, it may instmct the jury to infer 
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that the missing evidence would have been favorable to the defense, or it may dismiss the 
charges. See e,g. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 917; Delisle, 648 A.2d at 643. 
Such an analysis would balance the defendant's due process concerns with the 
state's interests in pursuing a conviction. Fundamental fairness would be evaluated in the 
context of the entire record and balanced against the degree of prejudice to the defendant. 
Also, an appropriate remedy would have a deterrent effect, since state agents would 
realize that destroying evidence before trial will entitle a defendant to a remedy. 
Finally, the state claims that a state constitutional analysis was not preserved. 
(Brief of Appellee at 44-45). As stated supra, pp. 16-18, to preserve an issue for appeal, a 
defendant must make a timely objection, and he must give notice to the trial court of the 
error in order that the court may correct the error if necessary. Hoi gate, 2000 UT 74, ^11. 
In this case, Tiedemann preserved the state constitutional issue for appeal. He 
argued that Youngblood was insufficient to adequately protect due process and 
fundamental fairness (R. 398, 399). He identified historical references to the Utah due 
process provision and requested that the trial court apply a separate state analysis for 
relief under article I, § 7. (See R. 400-401). He cited to several state courts that have 
rejected the Youngblood analysis for a balancing approach, including Ferguson and 
Hammond (id.), which set forth the approach argued on appeal. (Brief of Appellant, 
Point II.B.) He pointed out that in other jurisdictions, the defendant is not required to 
make a showing of bad faith under a state constitutional analysis. (R. 400). Also, even 
without a showing of bad faith, the destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence may 
be prejudicial to the defendant. (R. 401). 
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Tiedemann's argument supported a separate state constitutional analysis that 
would involve the balancing factors. Also, he recognized that the state analysis would 
require further proceedings in the trial court. (R. 638:28). 
The defense did all that it was required to preserve the issue. See 438 Main Street 
v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004 UT 72,1J51, 99 p - 3 d 8°1 (stating that to preserve an issue, the 
issue must be timely presented with supporting evidence or relevant legal authority so as 
to give the trial court the opportunity to rule on it). This Court may consider the matter 
on the merits without deference to the trial court, and it may find that the trial court erred. 
See State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (whether the Utah 
Constitution provides a separate analysis is a question of law). 
CONCLUSION 
As stated in the opening Brief of Appellant and here, Tiedemann respectfully 
requests that this Court order suppression of the confessions; and he requests further pro-
ceedings for a remedy under the Utah Constitution, where the state destroyed evidence. 
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